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Abstract. Within the field of biocybersecurity, it is important to understand 
what vulnerabilities may be uncovered in the processing of biologics as well as 
how they can be safeguarded as they intersect with cyber and cyber-physical 
systems, as noted by the Peccoud Lab, to ensure not only product and brand in-
tegrity, but protect those served. Recent findings have revealed that biological 
systems can be used to compromise computer systems and vice versa. While 
regular and sophisticated attacks are still years away, time is of the essence to 
better understand ways to deepen critique and grasp intersectional vulnerabili-
ties within bioprocessing as processes involved become increasingly digitally 
accessible. Wargames have been shown to be successful within improving 
group dynamics in response to anticipated cyber threats, and they can be used 
towards addressing possible threats within biocybersecurity. Within this paper, 
we discuss the growing prominence of biocybersecurity, the importance of bio-
cybersecurity to bioprocessing , with respect to domestic and international con-
texts, and reasons for emphasizing the biological component in the face of ex-
plosive growth in biotechnology and thus separating the terms biocybersecurity 
and cyberbiosecurity. Additionally, a discussion and manual is provided for a 
simulation towards organizational learning to sense and shore up vulnerabilities 
that may emerge within an organization's bioprocessing pipeline 
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1 Introduction - Importance of Biocybersecurity to 
Bioprocessing 
Work governing the processing living biological systems and their components 
falls under bioprocessing. This stretches from the initial research, to the development 
and manufacturing, and eventually the commercialization of products [1]. Biopro-
cessing constitutes trillions towards the world economy and continues to grow as 
novel uses of bio products increase in demand, covering food, fuel, cosmetics, drugs, 
construction, packaging, and more [1]. As means of biocomputing, bioprocessing, and 
storage merge and become increasingly accessible and feasible, paired with growing 
 
 
 
appetites for green technology, the growth of the bioeconomy can be expected to fur-
ther expand [1-11]. Murch and Richardson point out that entire bioprocessing pipeline 
is vulnerable to attacks at multiple steps along the way where bioprocessing equip-
ment converges with the internet, which calls to need for additional scrutiny in design 
and monitoring of organization bioprocessing pipelines [1,6,12-14]. To do so other-
wise invites potential disruptions in the world’s functioning as the bioeconomy  grows 
[1,4].  
Much of the progress in bioprocessing will hinge on increased automation aid-
ed by advanced algorithmic processes, increasing engagement with Information 
Technology, or IT, for short. IT spending, as with that of bioprocessing, has also 
reached trillions in worldwide spending, with the expectation to continue [15-16]. 
Paired with open-source methodologies being both profitable and adapted world-
wide, economies worldwide are witnessing unprecedented growth in communication 
and digital technological development [15-23]. Further paired with biological compu-
ting and storage, technologies within the bioprocessing pipeline may witness shifts in 
development that will require new lines of expertise in operation and defense. None-
theless, basic means of protecting data and processes remain essential [15-23]. As 
entities engage advanced bioprocessing with aim to run lean operations, it is expected 
that they will employ networks of connected bioprocessing infrastructure, which will 
need a great deal of IT expertise for both management and security. For this, it is im-
portant that war games be employed by such IT teams to simulate risked posed in 
their infrastructure.  
2 Importance of Emphasizing the Bio Component in 
Biocybersecurity 
The primary cause for the development and demarcation of a new field of 
study is that biological processes are no longer simply the end result of data pro-
cessing. Biological data is being used as interlocks (retina, fingerprint scanners), to 
inform decisions (health monitors), and even as the data processing techniques them-
selves (biocomputing). Thus, in a biocybersecurity context, biological phenomena can 
act as interlocks, and even as facilitatory steps in a cybersecurity system. Biology, and 
its manifold aspects introduce numerous targets that can be exploited such as in sim-
ple behaviors exhibited by organisms down to the qualities of organic compounds that 
comprise said organisms. That is, transport of biomolecules within or between organ-
isms can be monitored precisely as well as the targeting of specific genes within an 
organism [4-5]. These can be examined and targeted on both macro and microscales, 
requiring creativity, but yielding potentially profitable results. For example, the actor 
can examine the data from someone’s Fitbit to determine their night and daytime 
activities, for deciphering their target’s lifestyle and how to take advantage of that[5, 
23-25]. The same can be done for an entire community, in which a company might 
want to gain additional data on diet or work patterns, to better plan food truck loca-
tions. In terms of monitoring and targeting qualities, an insurance company can exam-
ine one’s genome to glean and set new rates for individuals based off of projected 
diseases that an individual may develop [26]. Although flawed, it is expected that the 
tools of analysis and their predictive power will strengthen [27]. In time, as biopro-
cessing infrastructure leans on biocomputing, our societies will need to examine such 
biological systems in an analogous way. In terms of the bioprocessing pipeline, DNA 
can be used to encode weapons to attack machinery that interfaces with it, but also 
can be a means of smuggling [13, 28]. As Peccoud and others rightly point out, a 
naivety in design and protocol can prove disastrous for an organization’s enterprise 
[4,12-13,28]. Thus, teams are encouraged to engage in rigorous examination of the 
pipeline. 
3 WarGame Simulation 
Description of and Manual for Wargame Activity for bioprocessing teams: 
 
The following guide is a fast and simple guide to doing a preliminary biocy-
bersecurity analysis for a bioprocessing center, or any facility that uses biosecurity 
measures or uses large amounts of biological data: 
 
Preliminary Step 1 - Selection: Elect or appoint an individual to run the activ-
ity. It is recommended that this person has knowledge of Information and cyber secu-
rity, but any person with active interpersonal skills should do. The gather any individ-
uals interested or with a vested interest in security. Additionally, be sure to screen and 
update participants on knowledge of biology and biosecurity concepts. 
 
Preliminary Step 2 - Review: Review the current active security procedures 
and evaluate participation in them. For instance, investigate how many unsecured 
devices are in the facility, or how many people leave passwords out or computers 
unlocked. Now the activity can begin. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A Review of Attack and Defence Routes to Consider 
 
Step 1 - Training: divide the participants into 2 groups. The data defenders 
and the data hackers. After reviewing the current security protocols as a group, a 
hacker and defender will pair up. The hacker should attempt to identify a given vul-
nerability in the current system. The data defender should then attempt to find a way 
to fix or “patch” that vulnerability. For instance, a facility that has users that frequent-
ly use exposed USB SSD devices can be made vulnerable by a malicious actor dis-
tributing flash drives with malware on them. Potential defenses include having these 
devices in the facility, educating users as to the hazards they pose, or disabling inac-
tive USB ports. This section is meant to be an introduction to the key methods used- 
and should only last 5-10 minutes. Then have the participants switch partners, switch 
roles, or both. 
 
Data Defender Data Hacker 
University/Community 
Bio Lab  
Company or Rival Lab looking to gain lab/research/material 
access or impede research 
Government Lab /  
Regulatory Agency 
State-Level Hacker from Rival Country looking to gain access 
to privileged research or product information 
Company Lab Rival Company looking to steal/overcome IP and gain a 
market edge or sabotage company assets 
Hospital, Prison, Ransomware Hackers looking to attack patients/equipment to 
derive ransoms or compromise medical equipment to harm an 
individual 
Insurance Insurance Fraudsters looking to increase costs, skim 
resources, and or disrupt healthcare access 
 
Figure 2: Potential Teams: Data Defenders vs Data Hackers 
 
Step 2 - Group Ideation: After a few rounds of training, several key ideas or 
vulnerabilities may become evident. Instead of patching them immediately, at this 
time, two groups should be formed- again Data Defenders and Data Hackers. This 
time, they should both be isolated, and allowed to envision defenses against the vul-
nerabilities or exploits pertaining to vulnerabilities of the facility (respectively). Self 
selection into the groups is encouraged, as long as both are roughly equal. Allow suf-
ficient time to ideate strategies, and supply materials like adhesive notes, whiteboards, 
and other common office supplies. The time spent on this stage should be slightly 
longer than the training stage. 
 
Step 3 - War Game: This is the terminal stage of the activity. This section 
should be recorded in some way in order to analyze weaknesses and potential plans 
that could ameliorate security vulnerabilities. The activity will take a call-and re-
sponse style. Align the groups opposite of each other. The hacker group will an-
nounce a plan to exploit a security vulnerability, and the data defender group will 
have to state a plan to implement mitigation strategies for that plan. This will continue 
until an impasse is reached or the realistic time limit is reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Call and Response Activity Flow 
4 Discussion 
Common exploitations found in trial tuns of this activity have been the following: 
 
1. The inefficiency and potential exploitations of security theater 
2. The security implications of underpaid or unpaid workers 
3. Miscommunications of conventional security threats 
4. Lack of knowledge of novel types of threats 
5. Security implications of sub-standard resources 
 
All these combined illustrate that considerable gaps in knowledge exist among 
potential staff concerning firms that deal in some degree of bioprocessing operations. 
Regardless of subindustry, it is important that members who take part in such war-
games switch sides and remain updated on new trends within biocybersecurity as well 
as separate developments within cybersecurity and biosecurity, as both fields may 
have developments that do not yet materially overlap. Further, these war games 
should be run frequently so as to keep staff in practice and cognizant of dangers that 
may exist. It is important to note that the style and order of wargaming can be varied 
to suit the organization’s need. That being said, it is suggested and encouraged that 
teams vary their playstyle and introduce different scenarios. For example, the question 
of a wargame involving 3 or more opposing groups is worthy of exploration as can be 
imagined from the interplay of state-level actors, corporate actors, internal actors, and 
ethical hackers within. As it is increasingly apparent that IT and Bioprocessing pos-
sess a shared destiny in the years to come, operations both mental and physical should 
reflect that for optimal security. 
5 Importance and Conclusion 
The primary importance concerning doing this as a group and as a facility in-
cludes the fast-paced nature of development in biology and bioprocessing. Different 
labs tend to have different requirements, tools, cyber-physical interactions, and work-
arounds. Lower funded labs may be vulnerable to more conventional means of pene-
tration. Labs with greater amounts of funding could be specifically targeted. Coupled 
with the fact that almost no research facility will have complete end-to-end supply of 
anything except the most basic of supplies (for instance ethanol or double distilled 
water), interactions that could be used and vulnerabilities and exploited for penetra-
tion will always exist. Only by the use of representation from all of the invested 
groups will more complete security coverage be achieved. 
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